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In 2016 the basic macroeconomic indicators of the Belarusian economy clearly proved that the 
Belarusian government failed to reverse the negative trends which occurred in 2015. The gap 
in the foreign trade balance grew, industrial production dwindled, foreign debt increased and 
the low foreign-exchange reserves continued. GDP fell for the second consecutive year and so 
it can already be stated that a long-term economic recession is setting in.
The crisis has been caused by the failing, outdated model of the Belarusian economy. The 
country’s difficult economic situation was also influenced by external factors such as a sub-
stantial fall in the amount of Russian oil supplied at preferential prices to Belarusian refineries 
and an economic downturn in the world’s potassium-based fertilisers, which significantly 
reduced the profits from sales of Belarus’s most profitable exports. The Belarusian govern-
ment, probably due to pressure from the long-standing crisis, has increasingly been referring 
in its rhetoric to the chances of improving the situation due to the development of innovative 
sectors (e.g. IT) and to the expansion of the freedom of operation of small and medium-sized 
enterprises. However, this has not translated into real reforms, even those limited to selected 
economic sectors. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka still fears he will lose full control of the 
Belarusian economy and is trying to maintain heavy industry based on large-scale production 
plants and dependent on supplies of natural resources from Russia and access to the Russian 
market. The Belarusian government is thus blocking the development of an economy based 
on strong foundations of economic growth which would be independent of external factors. 
In autumn of 2016 there was an unprecedented escalation of tensions between Minsk and 
Moscow which has yet to ease off. In this context, it should be expected that the crisis will 
continue in 2017 and the risk of an economic recession in Belarus will increase.
The continuation of negative trends 
According to official data, in 2016 Belarus’s 
GDP fell by 2.6%. Although the fall was less se-
vere than in 2015, when it fell by 1.3 percent-
age points, the value of GDP when calculated 
in US dollars dropped in the previous year by 
US$ 8.1 billion and stood at US$ 47.2 billion, 
which is the level from 2007. It points to the scale 
of the devaluation of the Belarusian ruble over 
the last few years. The main reason for the con-
tinued decrease of the country’s GDP has been 
the poor situation of the Belarusian oil industry 
which has accounted for 15% of Belarus’s indus-
trial production in the recent years. The sector 
reported a fall of over 19% in production due to 
two factors: the recession in the world’s oil and 
oil-based markets1; and the reduction of sup-
1 According to calculations of Belarusian economists from 
the independent Institute of Privatisation and Manage-
ment, the dependence of the Belarusian economy on the 
situation on the world’s oil markets is so large that even 
an increase in the oil price by 15% may lead to an in-
crease in Belarus’s GDP by 1 percentage point. For more 
information see http://www.research.by/webroot/deliv-
ery/files/ps2016r02.pdf, pp. 18-19. 
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plies of Russian oil2, as much as 6 million tons 
a year of which has been sold to both Be-
larusian refineries at less than market price 
as part of Russian energy subsidies for Bela-
rus3. This has triggered a fall of 40% (from 
US$ 6.8 billion to US$ 4 billion) in revenues 
from exports of Belarusian oil products4. 
Thus the importance of one of Belarus’s main 
sources of revenues has declined–in 2015 (when 
Russian oil was supplied to a maximum of 
24 million tons a year) it accounted for as much 
as one quarter of all revenues from exports. 
Nevertheless, in 2016 the share the petroleum 
industry makes up of Belarus’s export revenues 
shrank to only one sixth. The situation is further 
compounded by the decline in revenues in an-
other sector which is important for Belarusian 
exports – the production of potash5 which fell 
by as much as 23% to US$ 2.2 billion, and was 
caused by a fall in prices. 
As a result, in 2016 Belarusian exports dropped 
by over 12% and amounted to US$ 23.4 billion 
and imports decreased by 9% to US$ 27.5 bil-
2 Data based on the official communiqué of the Belarusian 
company Belneftekhim regarding its financial results in 
2016. For more information see http://www.belrynok.
by/ru/page/news/4647/ 
3 Russia’s preferences in energy and trade are the result of 
Belarus’s participation in all integration initiatives launched 
by Moscow in the post-Soviet area, close military co-oper-
ation and the (increasingly virtual) process of integration 
of both countries within the framework of the Federation 
State which has been developing since the mid-1990s. 
4 It is worth noting the importance the Ukrainian market 
has on the increase. In 2015 Belarus exported 3.2 million 
tons of oil products and 4.3 million tons in 2016, which 
is 1 million tons more and represents one third of all 
goods exported from Belarusian refineries in 2016.
5 Unlike all the remaining strategic sectors of Belarusian 
industry, the production of potash is based on the coun-
try’s own potassium salt fields and is thus independent 
of its co-operation with Russia.
lion, which led to a negative trade balance of 
US$ 4.1 billion6, compared to US$ -3.6 billion in 
2015. In comparison with 2015, the trade defi-
cit with Russia fell by over US$ 1 billion (from 
US$ – 6.7 billion to US$ – 4.4 billion), which was 
above all due to falling imports of Russian oil. 
It is trade with the EU, where Belarus has exported 
oil products for many years, which recorded the 
largest decrease – by over US$ 2.5 billion (from 
a surplus of US$ 2.7 billion to US$ 160 million). 
Belarus’s trade with the member states of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) has also decreased by 
US$ 1.5 billion, which means that the negative 
trend of 2015 is continuing and proves that criti-
cism of the effectiveness of this integration struc-
ture, established under Moscow’s auspices, are 
well-founded. As for Russia, it remains Belarus’s 
main trading partner with just over 50% of Bela-
rus’s total trade.
In this difficult situation for public finance, the 
Belarusian central bank succeeded in maintain-
ing financial discipline and was thus able to in-
crease foreign-exchange reserves – they stood 
at nearly US$ 5 billion at the end of January 
(compared to US$ 4.1 billion at the beginning 
of 2016). Similarly, foreign debt was limited by 
nearly 10% to US$ 13.6 billion, despite the fact 
that the government used the first two instal-
ments, worth a total of US$ 800 million, from 
the Russian-controlled Eurasian Fund for Stabi-
lisation and Development. 
The worsening condition of Belarusian business-
es is another manifestation of the economic cri-
sis in the country. According to the latest data, 
from January to October 2016 the number of 
unprofitable companies rose by nearly 15% and 
now stands at over 20% of all companies in Be-
larus. Since the beginning of 2016, the issue of 
problem loans (loans which are nearly or totally 
unpayable) which have been granted by banks, 
6 Over the last six years this was not the record low in 
Belarus’s foreign trade. Between 2010 and 2015 the 
trade balance vacillated between US$ - 9 billion to US$ 
– 3 billion (except for the exceptionally good 2012).
In 2016 the importance of one of the main 
sources of revenues for Belarus, exports 
of oil-based products, substantially de-
creased.
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usually under pressure from the government to 
state-owned companies in industry or the food 
and agriculture sector, has become serious. The 
fact that it is impossible to repay these loans 
has led to blockages and seriously affects banks 
which are thus de facto forced to subsidise of-
ten unprofitable sectors of the Belarusian econ-
omy. The safe threshold of the share of problem 
debt in total loans is an upper level of 15-20%. 
At the end of 2016 this indicator stood at 
12.8%7. However, it cannot be ruled out that 
a portion of the debt is hidden, not showing up 
in statistics. 
According to unofficial information from Be-
larusian banking circles, the total debt of the 
largest Belarusian production plants may now 
exceed US$ 6 billion and this amount is higher 
than the current level of the Belarusian central 
bank’s foreign-exchange reserves8. The deteri-
orating situation of companies and their prob-
lems with cash flow, the related ailments of the 
banking sector and smaller revenues from ex-
ports have led to an important drop in internal 
investments which have been one of the foun-
dations of the Belarusian economy in recent 
years. In 2016 the investment activity of domes-
tic companies, above all in public investments, 
decreased by nearly 18% and hit a record low 
in 2003 of 19% of GDP. This result is lower than 
the safe threshold of 25% which the Belarusian 
7 In the last two months of 2016 this indicator fell substan-
tially, probably due to transferring part of the liabilities to 
the Assets Management Agency which has recently been 
established. However, despite the improvement in the sta-
tistics, it cannot be said that this trend, which is dangerous 
for the Belarusian economy, has been durably reversed. 
8 For more information see https://news.tut.by/econom-
ics/530974.html  
government has allowed for. Important invest-
ments have been stopped in the housing sector 
and in the area of modernisation in the produc-
tion sector. They have been accompanied by 
a decrease in foreign investments which are so 
desired in Belarus, and no privatisation contract 
was signed in 20169. 
Two years of recession have clearly indicated to 
what extent Belarus’s economic condition de-
pends on changing external factors, above all 
the situation on the world’s markets of oil and 
oil-based products and artificial fertilisers, on 
Russian subsidies, and access to the Russian mar-
ket. The Russian factor, highly politically deter-
mined, is particularly dangerous to the stability 
of the Belarusian economy. Given the fact that in 
2015 only the recession in Russia had a negative 
impact on the economic situation in Belarus, in 
2016 the Kremlin gradually reduced its subsidies 
for the energy sector in order to force Alyak-
sandr Lukashenka to make concessions and to 
gain full control of Belarus. The dispute between 
Minsk and Moscow, which has been ongoing 
since January 2016, has extended to almost all 
areas of economic and energy co-operation. This 
has led to the access of Belarusian products to 
the Russian market (which is of strategic impor-
tance for a portion of Belarusian industry, above 
all the food and machine-manufacturing indus-
tries) being limited even further. Furthermore, it 
may be clearly inferred from statements Russians 
have made in recent months that the Kremlin’s 
pressure may increase throughout 201710. 
9 Aleksei Vasilev, the Vice-president of the State Committee 
on the Treasury (the body responsible for privatisation) 
publicly admitted this at a press conference held on 21st 
February. When explaining the reason for this, he pointed 
to a complete lack of interest on the part of investors. He 
did however say he believed the situation might improve 
due to the attempts made by the government to attract 
Chinese capital. For more see http://naviny.by 
10 Due to the present commentary’s focus on the economy, 
the vast subject of the crisis in relations between Russia 
and Belarus has only been briefly mentioned. It seems 
that the principal reason for this is Moscow’s discontent 
with Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s excessively autonomous 
politics, which is discussed in the Kremlin, in the context 
of the events in Ukraine, as a token of far-reaching disloy-
alty. For more see https://www.osw.waw.pl 
Two years of the recession revealed the 
extent to which Belarus is dependent on 
the situation on the world’s markets of oil-
based products and on Russian subsidies.
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Illusions of a ‘new’ economy... 
The long-standing recession has brought 
a change in the rhetoric of the Belarusian gov-
ernment and certain corrections in the strate-
gic planning of economic development. In the 
premises of the economic policy and the budget 
for 2017, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka ap-
proved at the beginning of October 2016, eco-
nomic growth was planned at the level of 1.7% 
of GDP11. However, as representatives of the 
government themselves admitted – it is quite 
unlikely that this objective will be achieved. 
The sources of revenues to date – the good sit-
uation of the world’s oil and potash markets, 
reduced prices of Russian energy resources 
and preferential access to the Russian market 
– will no longer ensure the economic growth 
which Belarus witnessed several years ago (in 
2005-2014 it was on average 5-6% of GDP). 
With regard to this, the Belarusian Ministry 
for the Economy defined three new sources of 
economic growth for the country’s economy: 
innovative production, the sector of small and 
medium-sized enterprises, and the Chinese- 
-Belarusian industrial park12. It seems that 
pointing to the project of the ‘Great Stone’ in-
dustrial park which is being implemented with 
11 The international financial institutions were far more 
cautious in their forecasts about Belarus. According to 
the assessment of the International Monetary Fund, 
the Belarusian economy will see a drop of 0.5% and the 
World Bank predicts this fall will be 1%. Analysts from 
Russia’s Sberbank offered the most optimistic forecast 
but even they predict a 0.2% fall in GDP.
12 For more information see http://www.zautra.by/art.php?sn 
_nid=22693, http://news.21.by/economics /2016/12/16/ 1274 
988.html 
Chinese investors is little more than propagan-
da and will not provide an important impetus 
for Belarus’s development in the immediate 
future. However, the development of the two 
other sectors could lift the Belarusian economy 
out of the recession in the long run.
The IT sector, which has been developing dy-
namically over recent years, provides a good 
example of this. According to the latest data, 
at present there are approximately a thousand 
software manufacturers in Belarus, the majori-
ty of them are based in the Belarus High Tech-
nologies Park in Minsk where they benefit from 
preferential terms and conditions of economic 
activity. Due to the low capacity for absorption 
on the domestic market, most of their products 
are sold abroad and in 2015 the revenues of Be-
larusian coders reached already over US$ 800 
million. Independent Belarusian experts esti-
mate that exports in this sector will increase by 
approximately 20% in 2016-2017 and revenues 
from sales will exceed US$ 1 billion in 2017.
Due to the success of this sector, which stands 
out against the backdrop of problems in tra-
ditional sectors, the theory of parallel growth 
has been gaining increasing popularity among 
circles close to the government. The concept, 
which was presented by experts of the Belaru-
sian Ministry for the Economy at the beginning 
of the year, is based on the premise of rapid-
ly increasing the share of new sectors (e.g. IT) 
in GDP growth and a gradual reduction of the 
role of outdated sectors of the economy (such 
as heavy industry). According to the ministry’s 
forecast, as early as in 2020 three quarters of 
economic growth in Belarus will be generated 
by more innovative sectors13. However, a high-
ly bureaucratic approach of the government 
may prove to be rather a serious impediment 
to the further development of this area. The 
government has not lifted all limitations on IT 
companies. It has also been trying, in its own 
13 For more information see http://naviny.by/article/20170 
120/1484895345-vlasti-belarusi-budut-sozdavat-paral-
lelnuyu-ekonomiku 
The Belarusian Ministry for the Economy 
has pointed to the innovative production 
and the sector of small and medium-sized 
enterprises as new sources of economic 
growth.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 233
bureaucratic way, to persuade IT companies to 
become more involved in the modernisation of 
less profitable industries14. Furthermore, rep-
resentatives of small and medium-sized enter-
prises, whose share in GDP is at present below 
25%15, have been pointing to numerous barri-
ers to the expansion of the sector. 
Many factors indicate that Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka is beginning to grasp the necessity 
of moving away from the distrustful approach 
to business circles which he has displayed so far. 
 In recent months he has often spoken highly 
of the private sector, ordering his subordinates 
to introduce solutions which would facilitate 
its activity as much as possible, in particular 
by reducing the burdensome inspections16. 
Furthermore, at the end of January this year, 
the first session of a newly formed working 
group responsible for boosting economic ac-
14 While conducting research in the IT sector, independent 
analysts from the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies 
(BISS) identified a series of problems which hamper the 
free development of IT in Belarus, such as an insufficient 
education base for the training of young people, the lack 
of guarantees of preferential terms and conditions of eco-
nomic activity within Belarus’s High Technologies Park, 
limited opportunities for a flexible system of salaries, and 
a method of employing foreign subcontractors. For more 
information see http://reforum.info/node/516 
15 In the EU countries the standard share of this sector in 
GDP is at least 60%.
16 One of the first measurable results of this unprecedent-
ed rhetoric of Belarus’s president is the decision of the 
management of the Belarusian fire brigade (announced 
at the beginning of February this year) to stop routine 
inspections of private companies. Reservations and con-
clusions following these inspections have often com-
plicated or even made impossible the activity of many 
private businesses in Belarus. It was also announced in 
February that inspections in retail and wholesale com-
panies will be suspended. Inspections will be replaced 
by a general monitoring of the situation in the sector. 
tivity was held and chaired by the head of 
the Belarusian Presidential Administration, 
Natalia Kochanova, with the participation of 
ministers responsible for economic policy, 
representatives of business associations, and 
entrepreneurs17. The group has been entrust-
ed with the task of developing a comprehen-
sive programme of solutions for businesses 
which would facilitate their activity. The solu-
tions will be implemented by presidential de-
crees.
Following in the footsteps of the president, 
his subordinates have also been quite critical 
of the Belarusian economic model. In February 
this year the former director of the National 
Agency of Investments and Privatisation Na-
talia Nikandrova openly admitted that the low 
level of foreign investments the previous year 
was somewhat justified since neither the legal 
regulations nor the government’s approach to 
investors encourage them to locate their capital 
in Belarus. Thus, in her opinion, it is necessary 
to introduce a fundamental reconstruction of 
the model of co-operation between Belarusian 
state-owned companies and investors18. 
…and the lack of real reforms  
Liberal refrains in the government’s rhetoric 
and a realistic choice of priorities in planning 
the country’s development do not mean a com-
prehensive change in the economic policy in 
Belarus. Alyaksandr Lukashenka is increasingly 
aware of the failings of the Belarusian econom-
ic model but is not ready to give up the state’s 
control of key sectors of the economy, particu-
larly of heavy industry, which is decreasingly 
profitable. He fears that a thorough restructur-
17 According to the available data, these are above all en-
trepreneurs linked with the government who benefit 
from its support in conducting their economic activity, 
e.g. a mogul in the food industry, Alyaksandr Moshen-
sky, one of the richest people in Belarus.
18 For more information see http://naviny.by/article/2017 
0214/1487072435-nevozmozhno-vesti-biznes-ne-naru-
shaya-zakony-znachit-takie-zakony-nuzhno 
Many factors indicate that Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka is beginning to grasp the 
necessity of moving away from the dis-
trustful approach to private companies he 
has displayed so far.
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ing19 of strategic companies in the sectors of 
petrochemicals, machines and metallurgy will 
lead to them being closed down or sold to the 
only potential buyers – Russian companies. In 
the first case, this could cause discontent among 
Belarusian citizens who would lose their jobs20. 
In the second case it would exacerbate Bela-
rus’s dependence on Russia, which is already 
important. Therefore Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
 has been reiterating already known theses 
about the necessity of maintaining state assets 
in the industry and has not only been blocking 
privatisation21 but also any vital changes in its 
management model.
It cannot however be ruled out that in the long 
term the Belarusian government will be favour-
able to a slow transformation in the structure of 
employment (which will be safe for the internal 
stability of the country) towards reducing the 
number of workers in heavy industry since its 
19 Certain production plants which have been deemed as 
having the most potential for development have been 
undergoing modernisation for years in order to increase 
their competitiveness on the international markets. 
However, these changes have not been accompanied 
by any important restructuring of the employment and 
management models. The multiannual programme of 
modernisation of the refineries in Mazyr and Navap-
olatsk has been the most important. As a result, the 
capacity of oil processing will increase to 90% in both 
plants (it is currently approximately 72-73%). The pro-
gramme was to be completed in 2016, but will be de-
layed for several years due to the crisis. 
20 In two plants manufacturing lorries and tractors (MAZ 
and MTZ) in the capital alone there are nearly 40,000 
workers.  
21 During the televised debate ‘Big talk with President’ 
held on 3rd February (which was energetically organised 
and appropriately directed), Alyaksandr Lukashenka in a 
polemic with an independent Belarusian economist Ja-
roslav Romanchuk firmly denied the possibility that key 
production plants will be privatised in the immediate 
future. In this context the lack of any privatisation trans-
actions in the previous year is understandable. 
potential has been decreasing. According to re-
cent available data, in 2010-2015 (data for 2016 
is incomplete) the share of workers of the pro-
duction sector in Belarus in the overall number 
of employed has fallen from 47.6% to 44.3% 
(e.g. in the capital it is only 28%)22. 
The government’s fight to preserve at least se-
lected elements of the state’s policy of social 
welfare is another factor which blocks market 
reforms. The main objective is to maintain calm 
in society and the passivity of the majority of 
Belarusians towards the regime. It is particu-
larly important given the fact that the income 
of Belarusian citizens fell by 7.3% in 201623 and 
that protests against the application of the 
decree aimed at ‘preventing social parasitism’ 
have been growing across the country24. On 
this issue, Lukashenka has in the recent weeks 
repeatedly stressed that it is necessary to raise 
the average monthly salary to US$ 500 by the 
end of the year. Although this announcement 
is not very realistic given the present circum-
stances, it represents an attempt to continue 
22 The share of workers employed in the service sector (ac-
cording to Belarusian statistics, this includes education 
and administration) has increased to over 55%. In par-
allel, the share in GDP has changed to the advantage of 
services, which in 2015 already represented over 50% 
of the total product of the Belarusian economy. Belar-
usian experts are unanimous in stating that the trend 
of the gradual reduction of the production sector is 
steady and will continue in the long-term. Furthermore, 
it seems that the government is trying to further en-
courage this process. According to unofficial informa-
tion, the management of large-scale production plants 
were ordered in the previous year to use all available 
measures (e.g. violation of workers’ rights; discipline, 
termination of contracts, reduction of the pension age) 
in order to gradually reduce the number of workforce. 
As a result, in the previous year as many as 107,000 







23 For more information see http://news.21.by/econom-
ics/2017/02/16/1297691.html 
24 The decree which came into force in spring 2015 extends 
to the period from 2015 and compels all Belarusian citi-
zens who work less than 183 days a year to pay a special 
fee (the equivalent of over US$ 200 a year) to the state 
budget.
Nevertheless, the president is not ready 
to give up control of key sectors of the 
Belarusian economy, above all heavy 
industry.
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the policy of administrative regulation of the 
economy which has been pursued in the last 
years and which is in contradiction to the prom-
ises to liberalise the economy. Furthermore, the 
Belarusian government is still trying use the 
state budget to subsidise payments of rent and 
utilities fees of citizens, who pay only 50-60% 
of real costs.
The reluctance of the Belarusian government to 
make economic reforms and the maintenance 
of its social welfare policy have for months 
been effectively blocking the signing of the 
agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund regarding a stabilising loan of US$ 3 bil-
lion. The IMF consistently calls for an immediate 
restructuring of industry and for rent payments 
and related fees to be raised to the market lev-
el. President Lukashenka has recently conceded 
that this will be met with firm opposition from 
Belarus.
The outlook:  
a continuation of instability 
The strategy adopted by the Belarusian govern-
ment, which consists in seeking new sources 
of growth while refraining from comprehen-
sive economic reforms, appears unrealistic. It 
can hardly be expected that innovative sectors 
of the Belarusian economy (e.g. IT) and small 
and medium-sized enterprises will develop 
so rapidly as to generate enough revenue for 
the state not only to maintain heavy industry 
(which is becoming decreasingly profitable and 
depends on external factors), but also to spur 
GDP growth. Furthermore, as the protracted 
negotiations with the IMF prove, the Belarusian 
government cannot rely on loans from the in-
ternational financial institutions without intro-
ducing fundamental reforms. Many factors in-
dicate that in the present situation, particularly 
given current social discontent, the Belarusian 
government will approach economic reforms 
with even more caution. The lack of a decision 
to restructure the economy not only makes it 
substantially more challenging to lift the econ-
omy out of recession, it also makes the present 
condition of the Belarusian economy depend-
ent on the development of relations between 
Russia and Belarus and on the volatile situation 
on the oil and oil-based market. Given the in-
tensification of tensions and many misunder-
standings between Moscow and Minsk, this sit-
uation is becoming a direct threat to both the 
further functioning of the Belarusian economy 
and the country’s sovereignty. 
